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ARTICLE
SYNERGIZING GOVERNMENT SERVICES




Recent research from the World Bank Group shows that in twenty
years, approximately twenty-five percent of investors divested from devel-
oping countries because of irregular government conduct.1 This divestment
not only exposes host governments to investment and job loss, but it also
causes reputational damage and poses tremendous litigation and arbitration
costs.2 Therefore, it is critical that governments provide a mechanism to
identify and resolve investor grievances in the early stage before investors
leave or their grievances escalate into legal disputes. This mechanism, often
called Investment Grievance Mechanism (IGM)3 by the World Bank Group,
would not only help the government manage grievances in a timely manner,
but also help investors continue and expand businesses by ensuring a more
transparent and consistent investment climate.
* Director in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (South Korea); Senior Private
Sector Specialist in the Investment Policy and Promotion Team (World Bank Group); J.S.D 2017,
Cornell Law School; LL.M. 2010, Cornell Law School; B.S.E. 2002, Seoul National University;
Member of Bar in California and Washington D.C. Special thanks to World Bank colleagues,
Christine Zhenwei Qiang, Roberto Echandi, Ivan Anton Nimac, Priyanka Kher, and Professor
Mariana Gonstead. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Korean Government or the World Bank Group.
1. Roberto Echandi, Ivan Anton Nimac & Dongwook Chun, Retention and Expansion of
Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy Responses, WORLD BANK GROUP, at
IX (2019), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/387801576142339003/Political-Risk-and-
Policy-Responses.
2. The costs for an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is known to be an average of
$3 million in administrative costs and $10.4 million in damages per arbitration case. Susan D.
Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1,
57–58 (2007).
3. It is also known as Systematic Investment Response Mechanism (SIRM) depending on
the context.
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The Office of the Korean Foreign Investment Ombudsman4 (OFIO) is
considered to have one of the best global practices of IGM to help current
investors continue and expand their businesses.5 The United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) reported that Korea’s Foreign Investment
Ombudsman system is an effective way to promote investor confidence.6
Many countries, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and Vietnam, have
shown interest in implementing systems similar to Korea’s Foreign Invest-
ment Ombudsman system.7 The purpose of this paper is to explore the insti-
tutional and structural management of the OFIO, and to draw lessons from
the successful operation of the Korean model for resolving and preventing
investor-state grievances.
II. GRIEVANCE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The concept of conflict management with respect to investor griev-
ances can be conceptualized as existing on a “conflict continuum” between
“problem” on one hand and a “legal dispute” on the other hand.8 Beginning
on the “problem” side of the conflict continuum, a problem between inves-
tors and public agencies can become a grievance if unattended, and can
escalate into a “legal dispute,” which is a focused disagreement framed in
legal terms.9 Given that most countries today have highly regulated envi-
ronments for doing business, the number of problems that arise everyday
between investors and public agencies can be significant.10 However, not
all problems become grievances, and not all grievances escalate into legal
disputes.11 Most minor problems can easily be resolved by direct interaction
between investors and the respective governmental agencies, but other
problems that remain unresolved can become grievances over time.12 De-
pending on the persistence of the case and on the severity of the impact
over businesses, such grievances, if they remain unattended, can escalate
into full-blown legal disputes.13
4. Ombudsman is an official or institution mandated to remain impartial while receiving
complaints or questions and to make efforts to resolve conflicts between investors and the State at
an early stage. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State
Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD SERIES ON INT’L INV. POL’YS FOR
DEV., at xx (2010).
5. WORLD BANK GROUP, INVESTMENT PROTECTION TOOLKIT 125 (2016).
6. Invest Korea, About the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), https://
www.investkorea.org/ik-en/cntnts/i-447/web.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
7. Id.
8. Roberto Echandi, Investor-State Conflict Management: A Preliminary Sketch, TRANS-





13. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 5, at 125.
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The World Bank Group suggests a practical solution package called
Investment Grievance Mechanism. IGM is designed to enable governments
to manage conflicts by timely identifying, tracking, and resolving investor-
state grievances that put investment projects at risk of divestment.14 IGM
requires the empowerment of a reform-oriented government agency and the
establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism for addressing investor-
state grievances arising from government conduct, which thereby reduces
this type of risk at its source.15 This mechanism also collects data on the
source of government-generated risks affecting investments and quantifies
investment that is retained, expanded, or lost as a consequence of address-
ing or failing to address such risks.16 Figure 1 shows the concept of IGM on
the Investment Conflict Continuum.
FIGURE 1: INVESTMENT CONFLICT CONTINUUM AND THE SCOPE OF IGM17
In a recent publication, the World Bank Group suggests several com-
mon elements from the implementation of pilot programs:18
• Empowerment of a Lead Agency: There should be a govern-
ment agency that is responsible for implementing IGM. The
Lead Agency should be empowered from the top political
level and coordinate national, subnational, and sector-specific
agencies that are more likely to be involved in investment
grievances.19
• Creation of an Early Alert and Monitoring Mechanism:
There should be an early alert mechanism that enables the
Lead Agency to learn about the existence of grievances as
early as possible before they become disputes. Once a griev-
ance is identified, the Lead Agency should record the case
profile, such as amount of investment, number of jobs, issues,
14. Priyanka Kher & Dongwook Chun, Policy Options to Mitigate Political Risk and Attract
FDI, WORLD BANK GROUP, at 15 (2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/
10986/34380/Policy-Options-to-Mitigate-Political-Risk-and-Attract-FDI.pdf.
15. Id. at 17.
16. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 5, at 125.
17. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 42.
18. Id. at 43.
19. Id. at 50.
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and relevant agencies.20 The Lead Agency should monitor its
progress and when a given case is resolved, it should record
the investment/jobs retained or expanded.21
• Problem Solving Methods: The Lead Agency should use dif-
ferent problem-solving methods to create solutions with the
agencies involved in a problem with investors. These methods
range from simple exchanges of information or direct negotia-
tion to legal advisory opinions.22
• Political Decision Making: If the Lead Agency cannot re-
solve the case, often the Lead Agency should escalate the
problem to a higher government authority. Once a decision is
taken to a higher level of authority, the Lead Agency should
monitor and track the resolution—positive or negative—and
its impact on investments.23
III. KOREAN MODEL AS AN EXAMPLE OF GOOD GLOBAL PRACTICE
The Korean Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO),
which was established in 1999, aims to resolve grievances of foreign-in-
vested companies in Korea.24 The OFIO has successfully operated based on
a strong legal and institutional foundation from the Korea Trade-Investment
Promotion Agency (KOTRA),25 the Korean Investment Promotion Agency
(IPA),26 and governmental empowerment from the Ministry of Trade, In-
dustry, and Energy (MOTIE).27
20. Id. at 51.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Id. at 43.
23. Id.
24. Invest Korea, About the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), https://
www.investkorea.org/ik-en/cntnts/i-447/web.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
25. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency Act, art. 10 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/
ganadaDetail.do?hseq=42757&type=abc&key=KOREA%20TRADEINVESTMENT%20PROMO
TION%20AGENCY%20ACT&param=K (“(1) In order to achieve the purposes referred to in Ar-
ticle 1, KOTRA shall conduct the following projects: . . . 6. Attraction of foreign investment
(including exploitation of overseas resources and energy) and support for overseas investment by
domestic enterprises.”).
26. Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are often the public face of governments seeking
to increase investment, promote economic and social development, and are generally instrumental
in negotiating investment treaties and concluding investment contracts; they also manage invest-
ment relationships through aftercare services. See World Association of Investment Promotion
Agency, Overview of Investment Promotion: Report of the findings from the WAIPA Annual Sur-
vey of 2018, at v (2019), https://waipa.org/waipa-content/uploads/Overview-of-Investment-Pro-
motion-2019.pdf.
27. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency Act, art. 14 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/ganadaDe-
tail.do?hseq=42757&type=abc&key=KOREA%20TRADEINVESTMENT%20PROMOTION
%20AGENCY%20ACT&param=K (“(1) The Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy shall guide
and supervise matters referred to in the following subparagraphs among the business affairs of
KOTRA and affairs related to such matters: . . . 1.  Projects implemented by KOTRA pursuant to
Article 10; 2. Projects entrusted by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2) The Minister
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A. Institutional Evolution28
Since its establishment in 1991, the OFIO has expanded its organiza-
tion and operation. At first, MOTIE established the Office of the Foreign
Investment Consultation in June 1991.29 This unit was restructured and
renamed as the Office of the Foreign Investment Grievance Consultation
under MOTIE in April 1996.30 In July 1998, the function of the Office of
the Foreign Investment Grievance Consultation was transferred to the
newly established Investment Aftercare Team under KOTRA.31 Also, the
Korean government legally established the OFIO and the Minister of MO-
TIE appointed the Ombudsman, the head of the OFIO.32 In March 2001, an
important law was amended that supported the political underpinning of the
OFIO by enabling the President of Korea to appoint the Ombudsman.33
Afterwards, the OFIO strengthened its organization and capacity by merg-
ing with the Investment Aftercare Team in 2015.34
B. Legal Foundation
As a result of this evolution, the current institutional setup has four
core elements: the Ombudsman, Home Doctors, the Investment Consulting
Center, and the Foreign Investment Committee. First, the Ombudsman is
the head of the OFIO who is directly appointed by the President of the
Republic of Korea.35 Second, the OFIO operates Home Doctors that spe-
cialize in various fields—including finance, accounting, law, industrial
sites, and taxation—to provide clients with one-on-one service by investi-
gating and resolving a wide range of grievances.36 Third, KOTRA has an
Investment Consulting Center comprised of public officials serving as
secondees from several ministries and municipal governments.37 The In-
vestment Consulting Center works with the OFIO to bring relevant griev-
of Trade, Industry and Energy may have KOTRA submit reports and materials to the minimum
extent necessary for the formulation of trading policies.”).






34. Invest Korea, supra note 24.
35. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(2) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
36. Presidential Decree for Investment Promotion Act, art. 21-4(5) (S. Kor.), translated in
Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/law
View.do?hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
37. For example, there are secondees from Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, Ministry
of Strategy and Finance, Ministry of Government Legislation, Ministry of Employment and La-
bor, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Ministry of Justice,
National Tax Service, local governments, and related organizations. See Investment Consulting
Center, INVEST KOR., http://www.investkorea.org/en/ik/icc.do.
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ance cases to various ministries and to coordinate possible resolutions.38
Lastly, the OFIO works with the Foreign Investment Committee that serves
as a platform for government officials to discuss policy issues or investor
grievances in higher governmental levels.39 The Foreign Investment Com-
mittee is chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, and is
comprised of vice-minister-level officials from other ministries.40
These elements are reflected in two legal instruments: the Foreign In-
vestment Promotion Act and the Presidential Decree for Investment Promo-
tion Act.41 Table 1 shows a brief structure of the legal instruments and
Annex 1 describes a full structure of the laws.
38. Choong Yong Ahn, New Direction of Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy in the
Multi-Track FTA Era: Inducement and Aftercare Services, ORG. ECON. DEV. 2, 12 (2008), https://
www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40400795.pdf.
39. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(6) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
40. See id. art. 27(2).
41. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act was first introduced on January 21, 1999, with
the purpose of promoting foreign investment in Korea by providing necessary support and benefit
and contributing to the sound development of the nation’s economy (Article 1). The Act regulates
OFIO from Article 15 to Article 27.
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Structure 15-2(10) 21-4(2) 
Workflow N/A 21-4(5) 






Scope 27(1) 34(3) 
Structure 27(2) 34(7) 
Working 





Request 15-2(3) 21-3(3) 
Coordination 15-2(3) 21-4(3) 
Recom-
mendation 
Contents 15-2(4) 21-3(4) 
Timeline 15-2(5) 21-3(5) 
Verification N/A 21-6(6) 
Escalation Escalation 15-2(6) N/A 
Monitoring 
Tracking Analysis N/A 21-4(7) 






Others Others 15-2(9) 21-4(6) 
C. Grievance Resolution Process
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act and the Presidential Decree for
Investment Promotion Act enable the OFIO to use many techniques to solve
problems between investors and agencies, such as information sharing, di-
rect negotiation, and recommendation.43 When available, the OFIO can use
42. Korean Law Translation Center provides unofficial English translation of the Investment
Promotion Act and Presidential Decree; translated version is available at https://elaw.klri.re.kr/
kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG (last visited July 28, 2020).
43. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3)–(4) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
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the Foreign Investment Committee as an escalation body.44 The former
Ombudsman, Dr. Choong Yong Ahn, explained the resolution process as
follows:
The resolution process takes many forms. Generally, senior con-
sultants, better known as Home Doctors, play a major role in the
decision-making process. In the first stage, senior consultants do
intake and evaluation in order to determine how a case should be
processed. Then, they consult with representatives from relevant
government agencies. After a case is reviewed and opinions ex-
changed between the Home Doctors and the Ombudsman, senior
consultants submit a grievance resolution proposal through offi-
cial channels. In the event that a case is rejected, the matter can be
brought before the Foreign Investment Working Committee, the
Regulatory Reform Committee, and/or the Office for Government
Policy Coordination.45
The OFIO categorizes grievance cases into three groups based on the
grievance process: Home Doctor Resolution, Administrative Intervention,
and Legislative Improvement. An OFIO Annual Report from 2018 de-
scribes these three groups as follows:
Home Doctor Resolution means problems solved internally by
Home Doctors, often through consultations. On the other hand,
Administrative Intervention means that government takes steps to
make improvements within an existing legal framework. And,
Legislative Improvement refers to regulatory reforms and/or
change in laws.46
As can be seen in the data from Table 2, most of the cases registered to the
OFIO are resolved by Home Doctors. Home Doctors are persons that di-
rectly contact investors and specialists in certain areas to review cases.47
Home Doctors can address and resolve grievances through direct consulta-
tion or information sharing.48 When they need to ask for more involvement
by government bodies, they can work with government officials in the In-
vestment Consulting Center, who are seconded from different central or
local governments.49 Administrative Intervention is the process by which a
44. See id. art. 15-2(6).
45. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12.
46. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, KOREA TRADE-INVESTMENT PRO-
MOTION AGENCY (KOTRA) 1, 43 (Apr. 2019), https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/reports/kotranews/20/
usrReportsView.do?reportsIdx=10545.
47. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12; Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3) and
Presidential Decree for Investment Promotion Act 21-3(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legisla-
tion Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/law
View.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
48. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12; Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3) (Coop-
eration) and 15-2(4) (Recommendation) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Insti-
tute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG;
see also Annex 1.
49. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12.
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case is resolved through active involvement or coordination by the govern-
ment agency, not necessarily by amending legal instruments or reform ac-
tions.50 When grievances are caused by legal instruments, and government
officials do not have discretion to resolve them, the OFIO seeks to amend
the legal instruments, which is counted as Legislative Improvement.51
D. Cases
In 2018, the OFIO handled a total of 269 grievances from foreign-
invested companies.52 Table 2 provides the cases involving the OFIO from
2014 to 2018 and is organized according to resolution type.
TABLE 2 GRIEVANCE CASES BASED ON RESOLUTION TYPE53







2014 9 (2.1%) 112 (25.6%) 316 (72.3%) 437 (100%) 
2015 14 (3.0%) 112 (24.2%) 336 (72.7%) 462 (100%) 
2016 16 (3.9%) 106 (25.9%) 287 (70.2%) 409 (100%) 
2017 12 (4.2%) 90 (31.1%) 187 (64.7%) 289 (100%) 
2018 6 (2.2%) 108 (40.1%) 155 (57.6%) 269 (100%) 
In 2018, grievances related to labor/human resources were submitted
to the OFIO the most, followed by visa/immigration, investment incentives,
investment procedure, and standards/certification/inspection.54 These five
grievance areas accounted for almost fifty percent of all grievances. Griev-
ances related to labor/human resources and investment incentives accounted
for a large share due to an increase in the minimum wage and the abolition
of tax exemptions in 2018.55 Table 3 shows the number of cases by griev-
ance areas that the OFIO managed in 2018.




54. Other grievance types were not included in Table 3.
55. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 43.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 10  3-JUN-21 12:34
306 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
TABLE 3: CASES BY GRIEVANCE AREA IN 201856
Field Case Ratio (%) 
Labor Relations 35 13.0 
Visa/Immigration 34 12.6 
Investment Incentives 25 9.3 
Investment Procedures 20 7.4 
Standards, Certification, and Inspection 20 7.4 
Finance & Foreign Exchanges 19 7.1 
E. Impact
The OFIO uses reinvestment as a key impact indicator.57 This is based
on the notion that it is important to achieve development benefits by reach-
ing existing investors that have already established a presence in the coun-
try,58 as the OFIO’s key mandate is to encourage investment expansion by
ensuring investors’ long and deep engagement in Korea.59
Methodology to calculate total reinvestment is very straightforward: it
is defined as the investment by already-registered investors, or the follow-
up investment after initial (first) investment.60 The amount of reinvestment
(notification basis)61 in 2018 recorded $14 billion and increased by 69.5
percent from the previous year.62 As a result, the share of reinvestment ratio
in 2018 increased to 52.1 percent from 36.1 percent in 2017. From 2001 to
2016, the amount of reinvestment has gradually increased.63
56. Id.
57. According to the “Act on the Management of Public Institutions,” OFIO and its mother
organization, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), is required to set a target
impact indicator and monitor the annual performance. Since 2014, they set the amount of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and reinvestment as their key performance index.
58. World Bank Group, Investment Policy and Promotion Diagnostics and Tools: Maximiz-
ing the Potential Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment for Competitiveness and Development, at
26 (July 13, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28281.
59. Id.
60. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 46.
61. The Korean Government uses two types of statistics based on notification basis and re-
ceived basis. Notification basis is the amount that is calculated based on the investors’ notification
when they register in the process of investment, and received basis is the amount that is actually
invested or implemented. Invest Korea Annual Report 2015, KOTRA 2, https://news.kotra.or.kr/
user/reports/kotranews/20/usrReportsView.do?reportsIdx=6612.
62. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 46.
63. Id. at 47.
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FIGURE 2: THE REINVESTMENT TREND IN KOREA64
IV. LESSONS FROM THE KOREAN MODEL
Since 1991, the institutional change and successful operation of the
OFIO can be summarized as a path that synergizes various government ser-
vices, including aftercare,65 ombudsman, and Public-Private Dialogue
(PPD).66
A. IGM + Aftercare
The successful operation of the OFIO shows the synergistic effect be-
tween IGM and aftercare function. According to the World Bank Group, a
study on global best practices of IGM revealed two patterns.67 The first
pattern features the deployment of aftercare programs, and the second fea-
tures the enactment of policies that address political risk that causes Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) rather than investment retention and
expansion.68 As the OFIO is part of an aftercare unit and its purpose is to
promote or facilitate investment, Korea is a good example of the first model
that operates IGM within a well-structured aftercare unit.
Aftercare function, usually a part of IPA, can be very helpful to imple-
ment or sometimes complement IGM. IPAs or aftercare may focus on at-
tracting new investors, but it has been argued that aftercare helps establish
long-term relationships with investors and thereby maximizes opportunities
64. Id.
65. The term “aftercare” can be defined here as the range of activities from post-establish-
ment facilitation services to developmental support to retain investment, encourage follow-on in-
vestment, and achieve greater local economic impact. U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Aftercare: A Core Function in Investment Promotion, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/
IPC/2007/1 (Sept. 2007).
66. PPD is an institutional arrangement that brings together a group of public and private
sector actors with the objective of building trust and bridging gaps that contribute to a more
conducive environment for private sector development. OECD, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth:
Policy Guidance for Donors, DAC GUIDELINES AND REFERENCES SERIES 1, 122 (2007), https://
doi.org/10.1787/9789264024786-13-en.
67. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at XI.
68. Id.
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for investment, reinvestment, and diversification.69 For example, IPAs may
act as a possible reception window for filing grievances.70 And, as part of
their role to advocate for the improvement of the domestic investment cli-
mate, IPAs could collaborate with Lead Agencies to share and diffuse infor-
mation and to advocate the IGM system.71 Further, aftercare units could be
a key institution in following up with investor-state grievances that do not
entail any risk of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) divestments.72 The OFIO
shows that aftercare units can be combined with IGM to support current
investors and promote the retention and expansion of investment.73
B. IGM + Ombudsman
The OFIO also uses the benefits of an Ombudsman to complement
IGM. The word “ombudsman” is Swedish and literally means “representa-
tive.”74 At the most fundamental level, an Ombudsman is one who assists
individuals and groups in the resolution of conflicts or concerns.75 The core
value of an Ombudsman is to ensure neutrality, fairness, objectivity, impar-
tiality, and even-handedness.76
In general, the purpose and implementation of IGM is different than
that of an Ombudsman. Even in some countries where a Business
Ombudsman (BO) is trusted to address grievances, the BO works outside of
the government and performs its neutral roles detached from internal gov-
ernment dynamics.77 On the other hand, IGM is by nature intra-governmen-
tal and enables a Lead Agency to use the existing government hierarchy to
discipline another government agency’s grievance-generating behavior in a
non-litigious way.78
Although IGM and an Ombudsman are not replaceable, the OFIO
shows that an Ombudsman can strengthen the IGM mechanism. The OFIO
uses the impartiality and independence of the Ombudsman to manage griev-
ances and to advocate for improvements in investment policy, administra-
tive procedures, and laws and regulations.79 The Foreign Investment
Promotion Act contains several legal provisions that ensure the impartiality
69. Id. at IX.
70. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 61.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Armando Heilbron & Yago Aranda-Larrey, Strengthening Service Delivery of Investment
Promotion Agencies: The Comprehensive Investor Services Framework, WORLD BANK GROUP
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33498.
74. What Is an Organizational Ombudsman?, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASSOC.  (2020), https://
www.ombudsassociation.org/what-is-an-organizational-ombuds.
75. Id.
76. FINRA, Ombudsman Neutrality, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (2020), https://
www.finra.org/about/office-ombudsman/ombudsman-neutrality.
77. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 62.
78. Id. at 44.
79. See id. at 91.
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and independence of an Ombudsman. For example, the Foreign Investment
Ombudsman is commissioned from “among the persons of abundant learn-
ing and experience in foreign investment business,”80 which implies that an
Ombudsman should be an expert of business outside of government. And
the same law says that an Ombudsman is defined as not being a public
official or government employee except when he is charged with a criminal
allegation.81 The independence and neutrality of Ombudsmen have also
been highlighted on several occasions in interviews, meetings, and press
releases.82
C. IGM + Public-Private Dialogue
Public-Private Dialogue (PPD) can be tailored to improve the opera-
tion of IGM and the investment climate of a country by addressing systemic
grievances. PPD is an institutional arrangement that brings together a group
of public and private sector actors to lay the foundation for a joint problem
analysis and identification of policies and institutional reforms.83 Over time,
PPD can establish consistent and systemic communication between relevant
stakeholders and the government, which can create trust and facilitate the
resolution of systemic issues.84 PPD can also play a preemptive role in
resolving grievances as it can identify public bodies with which investors
tend to encounter grievances.85 As a result, IGM with PPD can unveil pat-
terns of conduct across institutions, identify patterns of re-incidence by in-
stitutions or recurrent problems that place FDI at risk, and develop
evidence-based systemic approaches to forge and discuss reform agendas
with different investment stakeholders.86 IGM and PPD can also help
strengthen the capacity of the “offending” institutions to minimize recur-
rence of grievances and enable “offending” institutions to take defensive
actions to prevent issues from arising.87
80. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 12 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legisla-
tion Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=
49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
81. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15(2)-9 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/law
View.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
82. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2016, KOREA TRADE-INVEST-
MENT PROMOTION AGENCY (KOTRA) 1, 39 (Mar. 2017), http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/common.
FileDownload.do;jsessionid=ZXeODiAF0L9aTDxkGdYPYOPdsc5ADVRh4TxcA7P0ts
mNh27L9Rh0y7MT95ewrf4f.S168_WAS_servlet_oio2015?file_id=FILE_000000000000369
(“Both the Ombudsman and Home Doctors are building up mutual trust with foreign companies as
a troubleshooter, a main channel of communication and a fair assistant” (emphasis added)).
83. OECD, supra note 66, at 122.
84. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43.
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The OFIO relies on PPD for regulatory reform with the help of the
MOTIE. The OFIO and MOTIE have many ad-hoc PPD platforms, such as
the Regulatory Reform Committee chaired by the President, that discuss
common investor grievances and resolve systemic issues.88 For example,
there were eleven foreign investors’ grievances in 2016 about the Chemi-
cals Control Act (CCA), which resulted in an Economic Ministerial meeting
on a resolution to relieve the burden for registration and supervision that the
CCA placed on companies.89 And the Ombudsman is regularly invited to
represent foreign investors and deliver investors’ grievances as well as pol-
icy suggestions.  For example, at the Third Ministerial Meetings for Der-
egulation in 2015, the Korean Government announced that foreign investors
would have more involvement in the regulation making and reviewing pro-
cess.90 As a result, the OFIO also opened an internet portal for “Regulatory
Information” in 2015 and started providing regulatory information to for-
eign investors in a transparent way.91 On this website, foreign investors can
access information in English about drafts submitted by the Korean Na-
tional Assembly and government and can use an online petition channel to
submit opinions on legislative drafts.92
V. CONCLUSION
Conflict management is a very important function for governments to
resolve investors’ grievances in a timely manner. The World Bank Group
proved that IGM can be a useful and low-cost policy to harness the long-
term benefits of FDI.93 As a good global practice, Korea’s Ombudsman
model has been effective in helping investors continue and expand their
businesses. The OFIO has evolved and has been successfully maintained
because of the strong foundation of KOTRA, with more than fifty years of
experience, and because of governmental empowerment from MOTIE. The
OFIO also shows the importance of creative customization of different gov-
ernment functions and provides lessons to other counties that may be inter-
ested in implementing conflict management and grievance mechanisms.
88. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 52–62.
89. Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea (MOSF) Press release, Feb. 12, 2014.
90. Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea (MOSF) Press release, May 08, 2015.
91. Regulatory Information Guide, Foreign Investment Ombudsman, http://
ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/leg/intro.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
92. Id.
93. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at xi.
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ANNEX 1. LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN
  Legal System in the Republic of Korea 
Purpose Category Sub-Category 
Investment Promotion Act 
(Law) 
Presidential Decree for 








15-2(1) In order to resolve 
complaints from foreign 
investors and foreign-capital 
invested companies, an 
Ombudsman shall be 
commissioned from among 
persons with abundant 
knowledge and experience 
in foreign investment affairs.
21-3(1) The term of an 
Ombudsman shall be three 
years. 
Empowerment 




15-2(2) An Ombudsman 
shall be commissioned by 
the President, recommended 
by the Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy. 
21-3(2) An Ombudsman shall 
perform the following duties:  
1. Investigation and handling 
of complaints of foreign 
investors and foreign-capital 
invested companies,  
2. Preparation of policy 
measures for improving a 
foreign investment system 
and recommendation on the 
implementation to the 
relevant administrative 
agencies, and  
3. Other necessary matters for 
handling complaints of 
foreign investors and foreign-






15-2(10) A grievance 
committee shall be 
established within the Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency in order to support 
the duties of an 
Ombudsman. 
21-4(2) An Ombudsman shall 
be the head of the grievance 
committee. 
Workflow 
N/A 21-4(5) In order to efficiently 
settle the complaints of 
foreign investors and foreign-
capital invested companies, 
the head of the grievance 
committee may designate the 
staff in exclusive charge of 
settling complaints for each 
region or foreign-capital 
invested company, and may 
administer such staff.  
Delegation 
N/A 21-4(8) Except as otherwise 
expressly provided for in 
paragraphs (2), (3), (5), (6) 
and (7), matters necessary for 
the organization and operation 
of the grievance committee 
shall be determined by the 
president of the Korea Trade-
Investment Promotion 
Agency following 
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27(1) A Foreign Investment 
Committee shall be 
established under the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Energy to deliberate on 
the following: . . . 4. Matters 
concerning cooperation 
among, and coordination of 
different opinions of public 
institutions with respect to 
foreign investment. 
34(3) The president of the 
Korea Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency, the 
foreign investment 
Ombudsmen, and the project 
managers may attend the 
meetings of the Committee 





27(2) The Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy shall be 
the Chairperson of the 
Foreign Investment 
Committee. 
34(7) A secretary shall be 
assigned to the Committee to 
handle its administrative 
affairs, and the secretary shall 
be appointed by the Minister 
of Trade, Industry and Energy 
from among public officials 
belonging to the Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy.  
Working 
Committee 
27(3) A Working 
Committee shall be 
established to review and 
coordinate matters to be 
deliberated upon by the 
Foreign Investment 
Committee, and to deliberate 
on matters entrusted by the 
Foreign Investment 
Committee, as prescribed by 
Presidential Decree. 
35(1) Matters entrusted to a 
Working Committee by the 
Committee pursuant to 
Article 27(3) of the Act are as 
follows: . . . 4. Matters 
regarding the establishment 






15-2(3) An Ombudsman 
may request relevant 
administrative agency to 
render the following 
necessary cooperation.  
1. Giving explanations 
and/or submitting data; 
2. Stating opinions of related 
employees, and/or 
stakeholders; 
3. Requesting cooperation 
for site visits. 
21-3(3) Ombudsman can 
request cooperation when; 
1. It is necessary for 
investigating whether a 
foreign investment-related 
system complies with 
international practices or 
standards; 
2. It is necessary for tackling 
difficulties experienced by 
foreign-capital invested 
companies in their 
management or improving the 
related systems; 
3. It is necessary for 
improving the living 
conditions of foreign 
investors and foreigners 




15-2(3) The head of a 
relevant administrative 
agency in receipt of such a 
request of cooperation shall 
comply therewith, except in 
extenuating circumstances. 
21-4(3) The agency upon 
receipt of a request for 
cooperation shall present the 
results of resolving 
complaints or its opinion on 
such matters within seven 
days after receipt of the 
request.  
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15-2(4) An Ombudsman 
may recommend the heads 
of relevant administrative 
agencies to take corrective 
measures on related affairs. 
21-3(4) “Recommendation 
for corrective measures” shall 
be made in a document 
specifying the following 
matters:  
1. Current status and 
problems of related statutes, 
institutions, and policies; 
2. Details of recommendation 
for corrective measures; 
3. Matters recognized by an 
Ombudsman as being 
necessary, such as the reply 
deadline for related 
administrative agencies and 
public agencies. 
Timeline 
15-2(5) Upon receipt of 
recommendations made 
under paragraph (4), the 
heads of relevant 
administrative agencies 
shall, in writing, notify the 
Ombudsman of handling 
results. 
21-3(5) Relevant agencies 
shall, in writing, notify 
Ombudsmen within 30 days 
after receipt of a 
recommendation.  
Verification 
N/A 21-6(6) An Ombudsman may 
verify and inspect the 
performance of the details of 
recommendations for 
corrective measures.  
Escalation Escalation 
15-2(6) Where relevant 
administrative agencies fail 
to implement 
recommendations made 
under paragraph (4), the 
Ombudsman may request 
them to submit matters 
concerning such 
recommendations to the 
Foreign Investment 




N/A 21-4(7) The head of the 
Grievance Committee shall 
analyze the results of settling 
complaints raised by foreign-
capital invested companies on 
a quarterly basis and report 
them to the Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy within 
one month after expiration of 
each quarter.  
Report Annual report 
15-2(7) The Ombudsman 
shall prepare an annual 
report on reorganization 
activities, such as the current 
status of regulations and 
systems obstructing foreign 
investment, results of 
improvement thereof, etc., 
and submit the report to the 
Foreign Investment 
Committee. 
21-3(7) An Ombudsman shall 
prepare an annual report and 
submit it to the Foreign 
Investment Committee by the 
end of February of the 
following year; 
1. Current status of the 
regulations and systems raised 
as grievances by foreign 
investors and foreign-capital 
invested companies; 
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2. Results of improvement of 
the regulations and systems 
by the Ombudsman in the 
previous year; 
3. Other matters concerning 
supportive activities to tackle 
grievances of foreign 





15-2(8) No Ombudsman 
shall use data received from 
the heads of relevant 
administrative agencies, etc. 
pursuant to paragraph (3) or 
confidential information that 
they have become aware of 
in the course of performing 
duties for any purposes other 
than those prescribed by this 
Act, or divulge it to any third 
party. 
N/A 
24(3) No public officials 
who collect and compile 
data and statistics on foreign 
investment pursuant to 
Article 24 (1) and (2) shall 
divulge any trade secret of 
the relevant companies. 
N/A 
Others Others 
15-2(9) The Ombudsman 
shall be deemed a public 
official for the purposes of 
penal provisions under 
Articles 129 through 132 of 
the Criminal Act. 
21-4(6) Where an employee 
belonging to the Grievance 
Committee hears opinions or 
visits a site under Article 15-
2(3) of the Act to support the 
duties of the Ombudsman, 
he/she shall carry a certificate 
of identification indicating 
his/her authority and produce 
it to interested persons.  
